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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jeffrey Daniel Casad appeals following his conviction on two counts of felony
injury to a child. Mr. Casad asserts that the district court erred when, over his objection,
it allowed the State to present testimony and evidence that he expressed no interest in
services for his children or seeing his children after they were taken from him because it
was irrelevant, propensity evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Jeffrey Daniel Casad was charged, by Indictment, with two counts of injury to
children for purportedly "failing to provide proper nourishment and/or for environmental
deprivation resulting in failure to thrive and/or developmental delays" with respect to two
children for whom he had care or custody. (R., pp.9-10.)
At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the district court, over Mr. Casad's relevance
and prejudice objections, ruled that the State could present evidence of his "refusal of
services and refusal to visit the children" after they were taken as a result of the conduct
for which he was being prosecuted.

(Tr., p.62, Ls.6-23; R., pp.120-22.)

During the

course of the trial, the State presented evidence that included numerous statements
attributed to Mr. Casad indicating that, after the children were taken, he was not
interested in regaining custody of his children, did not wish to visit them, and did not
inquire about them. (Tr., p.244, Ls.10-23, p.320, L.11 - p.321, L.19; State's Exhibit No.
40.)
Following the presentation of the case to the jury, Mr. Casad was found guilty of
both counts. (Tr., p.624, Ls.3-24.) Ultimately, he received consecutive sentences of ten
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years, with two years fixed, for Count I and five years, with no fixed portion, for Count II,
with

of the sentences suspended in favor of a six-year term of probation.

(Tr., p.683, L.25 - p.685, L.23.)
Mr. Casad filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.225.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when, over Mr. Casad's objection, it permitted the State to
present irrelevant, propensity evidence?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When, Over Mr. Casad's Obiection, It Permitted The State To
Present Irrelevant, Propensity Evidence
At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the district court, over Mr. Casad's relevance
and prejudice objections, ruled that the State could present evidence of his "refusal of
services and refusal to visit the children" after they were taken as a result of the conduct
for which he was being prosecuted.

(Tr., p.62, Ls.6-23; R., pp:120-22.)

During the

course of the trial, the State presented evidence that included numerous statements
attributed to Mr. Casad indicating that, after the children were taken, he was not
interested in regaining custody of his children, did not wish to visit them, and did not
inquire about them. (Tr., p.244, Ls.10-23, p.320, L.11

p.321, L.1 · State's Exhibit No.

40.)
During its initial closing argument, the State argued, "But what does he respond
in one of the jail calls? Well, it's not like they have lost anything physical when these
kids were taken. It's not like he lost the car. Wasn't that, basically, what he tells law
enforcement, as well? 'Take them. They can have them."' (Tr., p.586, Ls.2-7.) A few
minutes later, the State argued,
He never again inquired as to the children. Did you notice that the Health
and Welfare worker told him that [D.C.] was hospitalized and wanted to
give him information on failure to thrive? He knows what that is, because
he knows everything. Never visited with the children. That was it. He
was right. They took the children they can have them.
(Tr., p.593, L.25 - p.594, L.7.) The State's final reference, in its initial closing argument,
to Mr. Casad's disinterest in regaining his children after they were taken was to argue,
"And he doesn't want the children returned." (Tr., p.591, Ls.23-24.)
During the State's rebuttal closing argument, it argued,
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And it's a crime when it's under these circumstances, and he did willfully
do it
You can tell that when you listen to the jail calls. You can tell that from when he talked to Health and Welfare, it was only the next day. And if he
didn't really think anything was wrong with his children, why is he telling
them the day that they're removed, "Take them. Just take them. I don't
want them back." If he didn't think anything was wrong with them, why
wouldn't he want them back?
Health and Welfare would just be taking them down there, getting this
checkup, and everything would be fine and dandy, and he could have his
healthy kids back. He didn't want them back. He tells them that.
(Tr. , p. 616, L. 16

p. 61 7, L. 7.)

The district court concluded that the evidence that, after his children were taken,
Mr. Casad was not interested in regaining custody of them, visiting them, or inquire
about them, was not covered by Rule 404(b), concluding, "I think that's res justae [sic]."
(Tr., p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.3.) The district court's initial reasoning in allowing evidence of
Mr. Casad's attitude about his children after they were taken was as follows:
The defendants'[1] refusal of services and refusal to visit the children, both
defendants have argued that this is not relevant and that it paints an
inaccurate picture, that it puts them in an untenable position of having to
rebut that evidence with their story of what has happened in a prior State.
I recognize that. I recognize that it's an untenable position, but that
doesn't make the evidence itself irrelevant.
The evidence of the
defendants' refusal to participate in services, the refusal to visit the
children in a fact finder's mind, may make an intent element more or less
likely. And I don't think it's unfairly prejudicial. It puts the defendants in a
difficult position, but that's different than prejudice. So that is admissible,
and the State can introduce that in their case in chief.
(Tr., p.62, Ls.6-23.)
In reconsidering its earlier ruling, the district court explained,

At the time of the district court's ruling, both Mr. Casad and the mother of the children
were co-defendants facing a joint trial. (R., p.16.) Mr. Casad's co-defendant pied guilty
before his trial. (Tr., p.481, Ls.2-10.)
1
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I don't know that they are relevant to intent, necessarily. I believe that
they are relevant to the
or the failing to act portion of the
burden of proof, which is to say that a fact finder could find that it is more
likely that someone who has no interest in their children is more likely to
act or failed to act where a reasonable person would otherwise act.
So I don't think this is an intent ruling. I think it actually goes to the
substance of the charge that the State is required to prove. But I believe
it's relevant on that basis. So that is my ruling on that.
(Tr., p.76, Ls.2-22.)
The district court's reasoning, on reconsideration, was based entirely on the
evidence's propensity value, with the district court concluding that the subsequent acts
demonstrating disinterest in his children were admissible because they could cause a
jury to believe that Mr. Casad had acted similarly at the time of the offense for which he
was charged.

Such a basis is explicitly prohibited by the plain language of the first

sentence of Rule 404(b). I.R.

404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is

not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted
in conformity therewith."); see also State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54 (2009) ("Evidence of
uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to 1.R.E. 404(b) when its probative
value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's propensity
to engage in such behavior.").
It is probably a matter of common sense that a parent's decision to abandon his
or her rights to a child is, typically, considered to reflect negatively on the parent's
character.

See State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 948 (Ct. App. 2012) (Rule 404(b)

"prohibits evidence of conduct beyond criminal offenses if it is proffered for the purpose
of showing a person's character and conforming behavior"). Regardless of whether it is
common sense, Idaho has made it a felony to desert a child with the intent to abandon
it.

See I.C. § 18-401 (providing that a person is guilty of a felony if such person,
6

"[h]aving any child under the age of eighteen (18) years dependent upon him or her for
care, education or support, deserts such child in any manner whatever, with intent to
abandon it"). As such, evidence that Mr. Casad essentially abandoned his children after
they were taken by the State was other acts evidence subject to exclusion under Rule
404(b), unless an exception applied.
Regardless of whether the district court erred in its stated basis for admitting
evidence of Mr. Casad's disinterest in reuniting with his children, it would not have been
relevant to show Mr. Casad's intent with respect to the crimes charged. Mr. Casad was
not charged with being disinterested in his children after they were taken from him. The
jury was tasked with deciding whether Mr. Casad "willfully caused or permitted" his
children "to be placed in such a situation that" their "person[s] or health w[ere]
endangered." (Tr., p.575, Ls.12-21 (emphasis added).) The Idaho Supreme Court has
explained, "Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be relevant to a material and
disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." Grist, 147 Idaho
at 52 (citation omitted).
The district court erred when it concluded that the evidence did not require
analysis under Rule 404(b) because it was res gestae. The Idaho Court of Appeals has
provided a thorough description of the term res gestae and its applicability to other acts
evidence, explaining,
Res gestae is defined in part as: "The whole of the transaction under
investigation and every part of it." The term is most often used in
connection with Rule of Evidence 803(2), the "excited utterance" exception
to the hearsay rule. It has been otherwise used, however, with reference
to an exception to the general prohibition against use of other misconduct
evidence. In this context, res gestae refers to other acts that occur during
the commission of or in close temporal proximity to the charged offense
which must be described to "complete the story of the crime on trial by
placing it in the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous
happenings." McCormick suggests the use of the term "res gestae" in this
7

context is inappropriate and that the term "complete story principle" would
be more appropriate.
State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17-18 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations and footnote

omitted). In explaining the limits of res gestae with respect to other acts evidence, the
Court of Appeals explained that it "is an exception to the Rule 404(b) prohibition of other
misconduct evidence only where the charged act and the uncharged act are so
inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a rational and complete
presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the uncharged misconduct." Id. at
19. Mr. Casad's case does not present these circumstances, especially in light of the
fact that the crime with which he was charged was complete at the time his children
were taken. As such, there was no need to present subsequent other acts evidence to
provide "a rational and complete presentation of the alleged crime."
Because the district court erred when it overruled Mr. Casad's objection to the
State's request to present irrelevant, propensity evidence, the judgment of conviction
must be vacated with the matter remanded for a new trial at which only properly
admitted, relevant evidence is presented.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons

forth herein, Mr. Casad

that the district court erred

when, over his objection, it permitted the State to present irrelevant, propensity other
acts evidence at trial. Because the error cannot be said to have been harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of
conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.
DATED this 22 nd day of September, 2014.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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